Random quantum circuit samplers have been used to demonstrate the exponential speed-up of quantum processors beyond what is tractable classically [1] . However, useful applications for these samplers have so far been elusive. Here, we propose random circuit as efficient devices for protecting the output of a quantum computer. We consider a scenario where the server performs universal fault-tolerant quantum computation and the user gains access to the output using a pseudo-random circuit. We show that a private key much smaller than the size of the output may prevent unauthorised access. For an n-qubit computation, a standard approach requires an n-bit key to scramble the state. We provide an information-theoretic proof showing that obfuscation can be achieved with order n−H min (X) secret bits, where H min (X) is the min-entropy of the output of the computation. As interesting computations are expected to have large min-entropy, this represents a substantial reduction of the key size.
Random quantum circuit samplers have been used to demonstrate the exponential speed-up of quantum processors beyond what is tractable classically [1] . However, useful applications for these samplers have so far been elusive. Here, we propose random circuit as efficient devices for protecting the output of a quantum computer. We consider a scenario where the server performs universal fault-tolerant quantum computation and the user gains access to the output using a pseudo-random circuit. We show that a private key much smaller than the size of the output may prevent unauthorised access. For an n-qubit computation, a standard approach requires an n-bit key to scramble the state. We provide an information-theoretic proof showing that obfuscation can be achieved with order n−H min (X) secret bits, where H min (X) is the min-entropy of the output of the computation. As interesting computations are expected to have large min-entropy, this represents a substantial reduction of the key size.
Demonstrating the exponential advantage of quantum computers over their classical counterpart has been the driving force behind recent developments in quantum computation. The first evidence of "quantum supremacy" came in the form of complexity-theoretic proofs [2] that there exist tasks that can be executed exponentially faster on a quantum processor than a classical one. These tasks include Boson Sampling [3] , Fourier Sampling [4] , and random circuit sampling [1] , with either commuting gates, known as instantaneous quantum polynomial-time computation [5, 6] , or with noncommuting gates [7, 8] . These computational tasks do not need to be useful to show the power of quantum computation [7] . A noisy random circuit sampler demonstrating the exponential speed up was implemented recently by Google on superconducting qubits [1] . The question remains how this device can be used for practical quantum information processing tasks.
In the future, fault-tolerant quantum computers will be capable of important computational tasks. We imagine quantum computers as devices servicing many distributed users, where the latter may have limited computing capability, or may not know the algorithm that is realised by the server. In this scenario, we anticipate the need to encrypt the output of a quantum computer. To realise this task, we consider a protocol for short-distance private-key encryption between a quantum computer and its authorised user. Unlike blind quantum computation [9] [10] [11] [12] , which is concerned with untrusted hardware and verification, our goal is to prevent unauthorised users from gaining access to the quantum computer's output.
We propose that a pseudo-random circuit can efficiently obfuscate the output of a universal quantum computer. In particular, we show that this can be realised efficiently using only Clifford gates, which can be made fault tolerant much more easily than the full universal gate set used by the quantum computer [13] . We assume that the user has the ability to apply the non-universal set of Clifford gates in a fault-tolerant way, and can implement measurements in the computational basis.
The server concatenates a pseudo-random circuit with the circuit that implements a useful, fault-tolerant, quantum algorithm, as shown in Fig. 1 . The authorized user applies the inverse circuit and measures the qubits in the computational basis. In order to achieve secure encryption, we require that only a negligible amount of information is obtained by a non-authorized user who does not know the private key and attempts to measure the output of the encrypted quantum computation. Note that the security does not rely on the computational complexity of random circuits. This is a feature of the protocol, since it does not make any assumptions about the computational capacity of the unauthorised user, who may have unlimited computational power.
The output of an n-qubit quantum computation can be encrypted in many different ways. One could encrypt and then decrypt the classical data obtained after the measurement using a one-time pad, which would require a secret key of n bits [14] . Otherwise, one could encrypt the quantum state |ψ before the measurement. Perfect encryption obtained with the quantum one-time pad would require a secret key of 2n bits [15] . Approximate encryption, one that encrypts the quantum state up to probability of failure, would instead require a secret key of O(n) + O(log 1/ ) bits [15, 16] . These protocols require that the encrypted state be virtually indistinguishable from the maximally mixed state. Expressed in terms of the trace norm, ρ − 2 −n 1 1 ≤ 0 , for some small 0 . However, the output of a quantum computation typically contains the answer to a meaningful question. For our purposes, we may simply require that an unauthorised user does not obtain the correct answer. This opens the possibility of performing the encryption in a much more efficient way.
In this paper we show that quantum data locking [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] can be exploited to achieve approximate encryption using order n−H min (X) secret bits, where H min (X) is the min-entropy of the output of the computation. It is natural to expect any useful quantum computation to be classically hard to simulate, therefore one has no information on the output prior to the measurement. This implies that the output has high entropy, therefore H min (X) ∼ n. In this case n−H min (X) can be substantially smaller than n. This suggests that the encryption can be implemented much more efficiently than previously thought.
I. RELATION TO OTHER WORKS
The security of the encryption protocol relies on the phenomenon of quantum data locking, first introduced by DiVincenzo et al. [17] . Applications of quantum data locking have been mostly focused on quantum communication. Previous works have applied quantum data locking, for example, to two legitimate users exchanging information through a wiretapped channel. In order to apply quantum data locking in this context, it is assumed that the eavesdropper measures before the honest parties perform classical post-processing. This requires that the eavesdropper has limited quantum memory [21] .
The application considered here is not subject to the limited quantum memory assumption. The goal of the attacker is to replace the authorised user, and not to wiretap a communication channel. Therefore, there is no loss of generality in having the attacker perform a measurement, since that is required to obtain the output of the quantum computer. Also, note that we do not require any classical post-processing by the authorised user and server. This is because fault-tolerant quantum computing includes error correction at the algorithm level, and it is not done a posteriori as in quantum key distribution [22] .
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to explicitly consider an application to secure the output of a quantum computation. The proof method builds on, improves, and generalises techniques previously applied in Refs. [23] [24] [25] .
Other known quantum data locking protocols and security proofs could be used to encrypt a quantum com- [18, 19] showed an explicit and efficient construction that can encrypt n bits of information using a key of O(log (n) log (n/ )) bits, with a leakage of no more than n bits. However, this construction cannot be made fault-tolerant [18] . The approach of Dupuis et al. [26] can account for non-maximal min-entropy, and would yield results similar to Eqs. (16)- (17), but it relies on sampling unitaries from the Haar distribution, thus requiring an exponential number of gates with respect to the system size [27] . In contrast, here we are using an approximate 2-design, which in turn can be sampled using only Clifford gates.
II. THE ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL
We consider a scenario where a server has the capacity of performing large scale fault-tolerant universal quantum computation, and the user is capable of performing faulttolerant Clifford circuits. The encryption protocol is then defined as follows:
1. The server and the authorised user share a unconditionally secure secret key of log K bits.
2. In advance, the server and user (publicly) agree upon a set of K n-qubit pseudo-random circuits, {C k } k=1,...,K . These circuits are composed of Clifford gates only.
4. The authorised user, who knows the private key, applies C −1 k and measures the output in the computational basis to complete the quantum computation.
III. PSEUDO-RANDOM QUANTUM CIRCUITS
Unlike works that considered the uniform ensemble of random unitaries induced by the Haar measure (see e.g., [15, 18, 19] ), here we apply pseudo-random unitaries from an approximate 2-design (defined below). This ensemble of unitaries has also been used in other applications related to information obfuscation, most notably system decoupling [28] . Recall that [29] [30] [31] given a δ > 0 and the vectors |α and |β in d dimensions, a δ-approximate t-design is a set of unitary operators C such that
for all ≤ t, where E denotes the expectation value over the t-design, and
is the -th moment of the uniform distribution induced by the Haar measure, i.e.,
Given an n-qubit circuit, a δ-approximate 2-design can be achieved with O(n(n + log 1/δ)) two-qubit Clifford gates [32] , or O(n log 2 n) random U (4) gates [27] . It is known [7] that calculating the output amplitude | α|C|β | 2 is #P-hard. There are known codes that implement the Clifford group in a straightforward faulttolerant manner [13, 33] . Since supplementing the Clifford group with fault tolerant gates into a universal set of gates is highly non-trivial, this means that a user who can implement only Clifford gates may benefit from delegating the quantum computation to the server.
Important quantities considered here are the first and second moments E | α|C|β | 2 , and E | α|C|β | 4 . The ratio
quantifies the spread of the random variable | α|C|β | 2 around its average. For δ-approximate 2-designs we can bound γ from above as
This coefficient will play a fundamental role in our analysis, and we will use this bound to estimate the required length of the private key.
IV. THE MODEL
Suppose the quantum computer is used to solve a particular problem whose solution space has cardinality M . Different outputs of the quantum computation correspond to different quantum states, denoted as |ψ x (with x = 1, ..., M ). We develop our analysis within the subspace of fault-tolerant computation that incorporates quantum error correction [34] [35] [36] . Therefore, the states |ψ x are assumed to be quantum error-corrected. We further assume that different outputs are associated with a prior probability p X (x), and that the output states |ψ x are (approximately) mutually orthogonal. Therefore, the uncertainty in the measurement outcome is well quantified by the min-entropy H min (X) = − log max x p X (x). From the point of view of the legitimate user (U) who knows the private key, the a priori description of the output of the computation is given by the statistical mixture
The description of this is different for an unauthorised User (U ) who does not know the private key:
Below we show that, if K is large enough, the unauthorized user can extract only a negligible amount of information from the state ρ U . Similar to other works on quantum data locking [15, 17, 20, [23] [24] [25] 37] , we use the accessible information I acc (X; U ) to quantify the potential information leakage. This quantity represents the maximum number of bits an unauthorised user can obtain about the output of the computation. We anticipate that similar results could be obtained using other metrics, see e.g., [18, 19, 38] .
For any given measurement M U →Y applied on the quantum state in Eq. (6), one can consider the mutual information I(X; Y) between the output of the quantum computation and the measurement result of the unauthorised user. Recall that the mutual information between two random variables X and Y is I(X; Y) = H(Y) − H(Y|X) where H(Y|X) is the conditional Shannon entropy. The mutual information vanishes when X and Y are statistically independent and reaches its maximum when they are perfectly correlated. The accessible information is then defined as
where the maximization is over all possible measurements M U →Y applied on the state ρ U . We require that the adversary's information is small not just for one particular measurement, but for all possible measurements they can perform.
V. SKETCH OF SECURITY PROOF
Proving the security of the encryption scheme relies on showing that I acc (X; U ) can be made arbitrarily small if K is large enough. This also allows us to quantify the minimal length of the private key that ensures secure encryption. To show this, we first write the accessible information as the difference of two entropies,
and then show that H(Y) H(Y|X) for all measurement M U →Y . The proof shows that for a random choice of K unitaries, one obtains I acc (X; U ) ≤ 2n with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
In general, the measurement map M U →Y is characterised by POVM elements Λ y , such that Λ y ≥ 0, y Λ y = I. However, it is known that the optimal mea-surement has unit rank [17] , i.e., the POVM elements take the form Λ y = α y |φ y φ y |, where φ y are unit vectors, and α y are positive numbers such that y α y = 2 n .
The outcomes of the measurement are distributed according to the probability distribution
with ρ U given in Eq. (6) . For given x, the conditional probability of a measurement outcome is
with
The accessible information in Eq. (8) is then given by
The security proof proceeds by showing that for increasing K, both p Y and p Y|X=x concentrate towards their common expectation value, and that the probability of a deviation larger than is exponentially suppressed. Therefore both the entropy H(Y) and the conditional entropy H(Y|X) will tend to the same value.
We show that both terms in the curly brackets in Eq. (12) are arbitrarily close to φ y |ρ U |φ y log φ y |ρ U |φ y for all vectors φ y , withρ U := 2 −n I the n-qubit maximally mixed state. The relative minus sign between the terms then implies that I(X; Y) can be made arbitrarily small. To show this we follow the method in Ref. [25] using tail bounds.
First, we show, using the matrix Chernoff bound [39] , that ρ U is close toρ U . Assuming K is large enough, with near unit probability we have ρ U ≤ (1 + )ρ U = (1 + )2 −n I. From this inequality we find that φ |ρ U | φ ≤ (1 + )2 −n uniformly in φ. For a random choice of the unitaries, the probability that this inequality is violated is smaller than
(see Appendix A for details). Next, we apply a tail bound due to Maurer [40] . We show that, for given φ and x, φ|ρ x U |φ ≥ (1 − ) φ|ρ U |φ = 2 −n I. This inequality needs to be extended to all codewords and to (almost) all values of x. In this way we obtain that, for a random choice of the unitaries, the inequality is verified up to a probability smaller than
where γ has been defined in Eq. (3) (see Appendix B for details). Putting these two results together, we obtain I(X; Y) ≤ 2 y α y 2 −n n. Since y α y 2 −n = 1, we finally find I(X; Y) ≤ 2 n. This bound on the accessible information hold probabilistically, but the likelihood of failure can be made arbitrary small for large enough K. Specifically, the probability of failure is no larger than P 1 + P 2 . Therefore, it can be bounded away from 1 by chosing K such that
VI. RESULTS
We have shown that for a random choice of K unitary transformations, the accessible information is upper bounded by a negligible number of bits 2n ,
provided that
Note that the secret key length depends on the coefficient γ introduced in Eq. (3). For an approximate 2-design using the bound in Eq. (4), we obtain
We assume that the computation needs to be run only once (or only few times, since the algorithms are designed to succeed with high probability). Compared to standard encryption which needs n-bits, we can encrypt the output using order n−H min bits. Since one typically has no prior information on X, one can assume that the distribution is flat and H min ≈ n. This means that the size of the key for encryption may stay almost constant regardless of the size of the computation, which leads to a potentially exponential reduction.
We plot Eq. (18) in Fig. (2) , where the exact value of K is given by Eq. (15), for = 10 −8 and different values of H min . Our protocol out-performs exact and approximate one-time pad Ref. [15] when n 50, and the advantage increases with increasing n.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Universal quantum computers promise a vast improvement in computational power. There are propositions as to what near-term quantum processors might be capable of [41] [42] [43] [44] . In this paper we have considered the use of a random circuit sampler to encrypt the output of a quantum computer. Unlike blind quantum computation, which is concerned with untrusted hardware and verification, we focus on preventing unauthorised users gaining access to the output of a quantum algorithm. We have considered a scenario where a server can realise fault-tolerant universal quantum computing. The user must be capable only of implementing fault-tolerant Clifford gates, and measurements in the computational basis. Quantum computation using only fault-tolerant Clifford gates require orders of magnitude fewer physical qubits than universal fault-tolerant quantum computing [45, 46] , making it much more accessible to a wide user base than fully fault tolerant universal quantum computing.
To construct the security of the quantum computer output, we exploit the benefits of quantum data locking while circumventing its known weaknesses. We have presented an information-theoretic proof that quantum circuits in the Clifford group can secure a n-qubit quantum algorithm with ξ n − H min (X) secret bits, where H min (X) is the min-entropy of the measurement outcome. Note that useful quantum algorithms are expected to be classically hard to simulate, therefore have high entropy, i.e., H min (X) ∼ n. These output states then can be encrypted with ξ n secret bits. This would mean that encryption can be obtained with a much shorter private key than previously thought.
and E[X] =ρ U = 2 −n I. By applying the Chernoff bound we then obtain Pr ρ U ≤ (1 + )2 −n ≤ 2 n exp −K 
In conclusion, we have obtained that, up to a probability smaller than
the following matrix inequality holds:
Appendix B: Application of the Maurer bound
We apply a concentration inequality obtained by Maurer in Ref. [40] :
Theorem 2 Let {X k } k=1,...,K be K i.i.d. non-negative real-valued random variables, with X k ∼ X and finite first and second moments, E[X], E[X 2 ] < ∞. Then, for any τ > 0 we have that
For any given x and φ, we apply this bound to the random variables
Note that
and E[X] =ρ U = 2 −n I .
The application of the Maurer tail bound then yields
with γ as defined in Eq. (3). The probability bound in Eq. (B5) refers to one given value of x. Here we extend it to < M distinct values x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x . We have Pr ∀x = x 1 , x 2 , . . . x , φ|ρ x U |φ < (1 − τ )2 −n ≤ exp −
This follows from two observations. First, for different values of x, the random variables φ|ρ x U |φ are identically distributed. Second, these variables are not statistically independent as they obey the sub-normalization constraint
x φ|ρ x U |φ = c ≤ 1. If the random variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x were statistically independent, then Eq. (B6) would
